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INTERNATIONAL PASSENGER TRANSPORTATION:





The majority opinion of the Fourth Circuit US Court of Appeals in International Refugee Assistance
Project v. Trump is one of the more important refugee transportation rulings in a number of years.  It is
likely to be a very important precedent regarding refugee travel transportation (Executive Orders (EOs)
13769 and 13780, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States”). At this
writing it is not certain what the future direction of these bans will be, but it would appear that the Fourth
Circuit ruling will hold considerable sway. This paper discusses these EOs’.  Procedurally, Chief Judge
Gregory and Judges Diaz, Floyd, Harris, King, and Wynn formed the majority. Judges Traxler, Keenan, and
Thacker wrote concurring opinions. Judges Niemeyer, Shedd, and Agee composed dissenting opinions.
INTRODUCTION
International Refugee Assistance Project v.
Trump1 is one of the most important transportation
case rulings in some time. As such, how and why the
courts have overturned EOs 13769 and 137802 fits
in no more ideal place than the prestigious pages of
this journal.  The paper proceeds by reviewing the
facts and opinion in the case. Transportation
implications and the future are then discussed.
THE EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND INTENT
EO 13769
In late January 2017, President Trump signed EO
13769. It was issued in response to alleged past
and present visa-issuance failings. The EO’s text
discussed barring nationals of certain countries for
bearing hostile attitudes toward America. It
emphasized countries’ nationals who would put
violence and ideology first and US rules second.
The EO also mentioned excluding countries’
nationals who believe in hate and honor killings.
Under authority from 8 U.S.C. Section 1182(f),
President Trump used the EO to suspend the travel
and transportation of foreign aliens of Iraq, Iran,
Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen for 90
days. Allegedly, the Director of National
Intelligence, Secretary of Homeland Security, and
Secretary of State would utilize this time to review
what additional information was required to
determine whether those countries’ nationals posed
a national security threat.  In addition, this EO
reduced refugee admission from 110,000 to 50,000
and permanently barred Syrian refugees. The US
Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) was
suspended 120 days. On USRAP’s resumption, the
EO ordered the Secretary of State to favor refugee
claims based on religious persecution but only if the
individual was in the religious minority for their
country of origin.
The courts responded to the EO with several
findings and rulings. The Fourth Circuit recognized
that Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and
Yemen are predominantly Muslim countries. For
instance, it cited to the fact that the nationals of Iraq,
Iran, Libya, Sudan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen are
respectively: 99 percent, 99.5 percent, 96.6
percent, 90.7 percent, 99.8 percent, 9.89 percent,
and 99.1 percent Muslim.  A Western District of
Washington federal judge granted a temporary
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restraining order (TRO), enjoining these EO
provisions’ enforcement.3 The Ninth Circuit denied
a TRO stay, declining to rewrite the EO by limiting
the TRO’s scope. It referenced the elected
branches as better equipped for that task.4
EO 13780
President Trump enacted a second EO in early
March 2017: EO 13780, “Protecting the Nation
from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United
States.”5 It revoked and replaced the first EO.  It
reenacted the 90-day suspension of travel and
transport of countries’ nationals from Iran, Libya,
Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen (eliminating Iraq
this time). President Trump relied on 8 U.S.C.
Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a), stating that
unrestricted travel and transport of these countries’
nationals would be “detrimental” to US interests.
The explicit reasons given for this part of the EO
included: reducing administrative burdens, enabling
proper screening and vetting of foreign nationals,
establishing adequate standards to stop foreign
terrorists’ entry, and countering entry of persons
from those countries that would be “detrimental” to
US interests.
The second EO disclosed that those countries’
nationals deserved extra scrutiny given these
countries’ conditions presented “heightened threats.”
With more detail then, the fact that these countries
were state sponsors of terrorism, had terrorist
groups compromising them, or were active conflict
zones allegedly justified this enhanced scrutiny.
Additionally, the risk of terrorism being exported
from these countries to the US was “unacceptably
high.” Nationals of nearly 40 countries could enter
the US under the Visa Waiver Program temporarily
as tourists or for business without a visa.6 However,
nationals of these six nations could not. To be fair,
though, the Visa Waiver Program did not grant entry
without a visa for nationals of or aliens who have
visited Iraq or Syria, state sponsors of terror (Iran,
Sudan, and Syria), or visitors to Libya, Somalia,
and Yemen.7
As more specific support, the second EO noted
Sudan’s state sponsorship of terrorism since 1993
(Hezbollah, Hamas, al-Qaida, ISIS-linked terrorist
groups active in the country). Two Iraqi refugees
received terrorism convictions in January 2013. A
Somalian had a terrorism conviction in October of
2014. No instances were provided for Iran, Libya,
Sudan, Syria, or Yemen. More specifically, the
second EO suspended entry for those outside the
US on March 16, 2017 without a valid visa as of
that date or as of January 27, 2017 (the date of the
first EO). Legal permanent residents, dual citizens
under passport from a non-banned nation, asylum
seekers, or refuges already allowed to the US.
Consular officers could issue waivers to individuals.
The second EO also suspended USRAP for 120
days and decreased refugee admissions by half,
both of which also were included in the first EO.
However, unlike the first EO, the second did not
permanently ban Syrian refugees. The preferential
treatment for religious minorities seeking refugee
status was also absent from the second EO. Before
the second EO, a Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) Office of Intelligence and Analysis
report became a public record. It disclosed that
foreign-born individuals who became violent in the
US gained this radicalization many years after entry.
As such, increasing screening and vetting would not
likely significantly reduce US terrorism. In addition,
another DHS report disclosed citizenship as an
unreliable indicator of terrorism. Finally, ten former
administrative officials with keen knowledge in the
area considered there to be no national security
purpose for total bans on aliens’ entry from certain
countries.
President Trump’s Underlying Intent
Early December of 2015, President Trump had
uploaded the “Statement on Preventing Muslim
Immigration” to his campaign website. It proposed
completely denying Muslim entry to the US. As of
February 2017, this statement remained on his
website. In a January 27, 2017, interview, President
Trump disclosed that the first EO’s preference for
religious minorities was directed toward saving
Christians.  On March 7, 2017, the DHS Secretary
revealed the number of countries with questionable
vetting procedures as in the teens. In addition, the
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DHS Secretary disclosed that there were 51
predominately Muslim countries, and the travel and
transportation ban only targeted six of them.
THE COURT PROCEEDINGS
Six American citizens with a family member seeking
entry to the US from the targeted countries and
three organizations representing Muslim clients
(International Refugee Assistance Project, Hebrew
Immigrant Aid Society, and Middle East Studies
Association) brought this case. Four argued that
immediate family members were having difficulty
getting visas based on the second EO. They all
contended that suspending entry prolonged
separation from family members. In addition, they
believed the anti-Muslim message from the second
EO resulted in disparagement and exclusion to such
an extent that some feared for their safety here. The
three organizations contended they were suffering
monetary damages from fighting the second EO and
decrease in funding from reduced immigration on
account of the second EO.
The plaintiffs wanted declaratory and injunctive
relief against the first EO’s enforcement. They
argued violation of the First Amendment’s
Establishment Clause; Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause (equal protection); Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) 8 U.S.C. Section 1101 –
1537; Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42
U.S.C. Sections 2000bb to 2000bb-4; Refugee
Act, 8 U.S.C. Sections 1521 – 1524;
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Sections
701 – 706. The same claims continued through the
second EO’s issuance.
The first district court found that some of the
plaintiffs had standing to pursue the violations under
the INA in denying them visas on the basis of
nationality, and standing to pursue Establishment
Clause violations. As the INA governed only the
issuance of immigration visas, not travel or business
visas, not all the claims could be adjudicated under
it. Under the Establishment Clause claim, the district
court found a winning argument, irreparable injury if
enforced, balancing of equities favoring the plaintiffs,
and public interest in an injunction. The combination
of factors led to a preliminary injunction, denying
enforcement of the second EO.
Defense Counter
President Trump relied on his authority to exclude
aliens under INA Sections 212(f) and 215(a)(1).8
He did have much authority under the INA
language.9
In fact, “[w]henever the President finds that the
entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the
United States would be detrimental to the interests
of the United States, he may by proclamation, and
for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend
the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as
immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry
of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be
appropriate.”10 In addition, “[u]nless otherwise
ordered by the President, it shall be [illegal] for any
alien to depart from or enter or attempt to depart
from or enter the United States except under such
reasonable rules, regulations, and orders, and
subject to such limitations and exceptions as the
President may prescribe . . . .”11
Plaintiffs’ Counter
They believed that the same INA barred
discrimination based on nationality.12 “[N]o person
shall receive any preference or priority or be
discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant
visa because of the person’s race, sex, nationality,
place of birth, or place of residence.”13
District Court’s Decision
“Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on the
merits of their claim that the [s]econd [EO] violates
[Section] 1152(a) but only as to the issuance of
immigrant visas . . . . They have not shown a
likelihood of success on the merits of the claim that
[Section] 1152(a) prevents the President from
barring entry to the United States pursuant to
[Section] 1182(f), or the issuance of non-immigrant
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visas, on the basis of nationality.”14 The
constitutional claim was the underlying reason for
the nationwide preliminary injunction, not this INA
argument.
Defense Counter
The Establishment Clause claim was not able to
have a verdict rendered on it. The Constitution’s
Article III requirements of standing and ripeness had
not been satisfied. Regardless, the consular non-
reviewability doctrine barred judicial review of the
claim.
COURT OPINION AND ANALYSIS
The Fourth Circuit declined to rule on the INA
issue. Instead, the Establishment Clause claim had
to be resolved, making the INA issue otherwise
moot. The issue was whether the Constitution
protects plaintiffs’ right to challenge an EO with
elements of religious intolerance and discrimination.
The Fourth Circuit believed the First Amendment’s
Establishment Clause to be paramount. The federal
government could not establish any religious faith
and could not favor or disfavor certain religions over
others. It ultimately affirmed the district court’s
preliminary injunction with nationwide impact.
Standing
Under the Constitution’s Article III, Section 2,
courts can hear only “cases” or “controversies.”
This fact means that a litigant must have standing to
bring a complaint.15 As such, the plaintiffs must
show an injury (first) that is traceable to the
defendant (second), and the injury likely can be
redressed through a favorable decision (finally).16
Of these elements then, only the recognizable injury
was in dispute. “An invasion of a legally protected
interest . . . concrete and particularized . . . actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical” had to be
shown.17 The merits had to be disregarded in
reaching this decision.18 As such, the court had to
assume the second EO violated the First
Amendment’s Establishment Clause.
Injury in Establishment Clause cases could be
shown in many ways.19 Direct harm from what was
establishment of religion would be sufficient proof.20
Sunday closing legislation obviously economically
injured merchants in Establishment Clause cases.21
Marginalization feelings were recognizable injuries
for this type of case.22 The first plaintiff had an injury
from personal contact with an alleged anti-Muslim
religious establishment. First, his wife was barred
entry, prolonging their living apart. Second, the
second EO condemned his faith, making him feel
marginalized. The injury had to be impending, not
speculative.23 Here, the 90-day suspension would
prolong separation, an actual injury that was
cognizable. In addition, the second EO did
disparage foreign-born Muslims, forcing them to feel
marginalized.
Plaintiffs could not raise others’ legal rights.24
However, the plaintiffs here were raising their own
rights. They were directly impacted. It was not only
individuals seeking entry from overseas who felt the
effects of the second EO. The Supreme Court had
permitted US residents interested in foreigners’
entry to have standing.25 Under all these standing
tests then, the first plaintiff had prevailed. As such,
no other plaintiff’s standing had to be considered.
Ripeness
The government relied on this argument: Because
the second EO provided for waivers to be
requested, the case could not be adjudicated until
waiver denial. Thus, ripeness was in issue according
to the government.  For ripeness, the court had to
weigh both issue fitness for judicial decision and
hardship from denial.26 Nevertheless, the court
found no reason to consider either element as the
challenge was facial. The second EO allegedly
violated the Establishment Clause without regard to
whether a waiver could be obtained or not. No
uncertainties remained here. Also, denying judicial
consideration would be undue hardship to the
plaintiffs.
Because of the doctrine of consular non-
reviewability, a decision not to issue a visa would
not be judicially reviewable unless legislatively
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allowed.27 However, a constitutional claim had to be
heard regardless of the doctrine.28 As such, the
doctrine of consular non-reviewability was
inapposite here. While judicial deference to the
executive branch on national security issues could
be warranted, it could not be permitted where
constitutionality is in question.29
Establishment Clause
Prevailing on the merits’ likelihood, irreparable
injury, balancing, and public interest must be present
for a preliminary injunction to be issued.30 For the
merits then, the district court asserted that, because
the second EO was facially neutral regarding
religion, the Lemon test was necessary.31 The
government argued the Mandel test was warranted
instead because it was more deferential and fit the
immigration situation.32
While Mandel should have been the starting point,
the result was a distinction without a difference. It
allowed for the exclusion of aliens under legislative
prohibitions that would forbid their entry.33 If
“facially legitimate and bona fide” reason elements
were present, then the courts would not look behind
the EO to a First Amendment constitutional issue.34
This rule of Mandel, applying to immigration issues,
was supported in a subsequent Supreme Court
case.35 “Facially legitimate and bona fide” reason
connoted a rational basis review.
The problem was that those cases referred to equal
protection and not Establishment Clause claims.
Rational review would be fine for the former but not
for the latter.36 Even though the political branches,
legislative and executive branches, had significant
authority over immigration issues, the courts still had
to ensure constitutionality of the limits.37 The
Mandel test placed a burden on the plaintiffs to be
carried.38 Facial legitimacy equated to a valid
reason.39 “Bona fide” signified the government
acting in good faith.40 In fact, the “bona fide”
requirement could require more judicial review.
The purported national security interest underlying
the second EO was “facially legitimate.” Absent bad
faith allegations, the inquiry would end at this point
in favor of the government’s position.  But the
plaintiffs represented that the second EO relied on
national security interest reasons in bad faith as a
façade for an anti-Muslim religious purpose. The
numerous Trump campaign statements against Islam
and the language regarding a proposal to ban
Muslims from entering the US showed an intent.
Hiding this intent behind targeting “territories”
instead of Muslims directly was inapposite. The
preference for religious minorities (other than
Muslims then) in the first EO further illustrated an
intent to disfavor Muslims, further evidenced
through the designated countries being
predominately Muslim.  An adviser suggesting that
President Trump wanted to find a legal reason to
ban Muslims also additionally buttressed the bad
faith. The second EO also resembled the first EO,
which did not do anything to counter bad faith
charges. The national security interest reasons were
weak. The national security agencies were excluded
from this decision process, and the DHS had stated
the EOs would not effectively reduce the threat of
terrorism.  All these reasons together indicated bad
faith. Because of bad faith, the court could then
inquire into the true reasons for the EOs and could
disregard facial legitimacy deference.
To review facially neutral actions, the Lemon test
would work in determining the second EO’s
constitutionality. Actually, the “bona fide” element
from Mandel and the constitutional questioning in
Lemon did work well together. The question
became whether the second EO had a religious
motivation primarily instead of a national security
promoting motivation.  The Lemon test involved
proving a secular legislative purpose, primary effect
not promoting or inhibiting religion, and lacking
excessive government entanglement with religion.41
To prevail, the government must show all
elements.42 This proof was especially necessary in
Establishment Clause cases such as here.43 Only the
first element was in issue for this case regarding the
Lemon test.
The government had to demonstrate a secular
purpose “genuine, not a sham, and not merely
secondary to a religious objective.”44 Just any
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secular purpose was not enough.45 The primary
purpose had to be secular.46From the viewpoint of a
reasonable observer, the court found the second
EO’s primary purpose to be religious. It also found
from the same perspective that President Trump
showed an anti-Muslim intent on many occasions.
The second EO was just an attempt for a more legal
rendition of the first EO, both of which had anti-
Muslim intents from the perspective of the
reasonable observer according to the court. The
reference to reviewing honor killings was considered
to be another attempt to demean Islam and to show
a religious-based primary purpose.
The national security interest was lacking. President
Trump issued the first EO without ever consulting
national security agencies. DHS reports
contradicted the national security justification. The
evidence to support the national security interest
amounted to just two Iraqi immigrants and a
Somalian refugee.  The fact that the ban applied
only to some predominately Muslim countries and
that those targeted countries had terrorism issues
would be relevant for the second part of the test but
not for the first part of the test.47 Here, the first part
of the test entirely resolved the issue against the
government. A national security interest could have
been present. If so, it was secondary to the primary
religious purpose. For Establishment Clause cases,
more than just the text must be considered.48
Whether a presumption of appropriate executive
branch action that was not judicially reviewable
attached was inapposite.49 After all, constitutional
limits still applied to immigration-related actions.50
Campaign statements could be considered in
interpreting the intent behind governmental actions.51
Contemporaneous statements could also be
weighed.52 Any distinction between a candidate and
the ultimately elected official was artificial. The
inquiry was whether a reasonable observer would
believe the candidate’s statements to be evidentiary
of the actions taken on election. For previous
statements to be worth consideration as to
government purpose, a substantial and specific
connection must exist between it and the
governmental action.
The second EO’s purpose was to exclude
individuals based on their religion. Thus, it failed the
first part of the Lemon test. As such, the district
court properly found the plaintiffs likely to win on
the merits of the Establishment Clause claim. Too
much religious animus motivated the second EO.
Consequently, it would be deemed unconstitutional
regardless of the level of scrutiny.  Finding in favor
of the plaintiffs on the merits automatically translated
into finding irreparable injury without the issuance of
an injunction. Losing First Amendment freedoms for
any time was considered irreparable injury.53
To support the issuance of the preliminary
injunction, the balance of equities still had to be
considered.54 Also, the public interest had to be
weighed. Both could be considered together,
though, as the district court did. With regard to
national security, the judiciary should not doubt the
President’s judgments.55 “Any time a State is
enjoined by a court from effectuating statutes
enacted by representatives of its [constituents], it
suffers a form of irreparable injury.”56
The court found that the President could not suffer
irreparable injury, just because of representing
constituents, on an EO’s enjoinment. Because part
of the second EO was likely unconstitutional,
permitting it to become effective would inflict greater
injury than the issuance of the injunction.  Reference
to national security interests did not counter all other
injuries in balancing.57 National security interests
were compelling but did not guarantee balancing in
favor of the government. In the end then, the injuries
to the plaintiffs regarding the First Amendment’s
Establishment Clause violation would be greater
without an injunction than to the government’s
national security interest should the injunction be
granted.
Under this same reasoning, the public interest was in
favor of the preliminary injunction. Protecting the
constitutional rights of a few benefits all. Actual
religious liberty necessitates government not favor or
disfavor sects or religion v. non-religion.58 The
injunction promoted the highest level of public
interest. All four parts of the preliminary injunction
test were therein fulfilled.
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Scope
Whether the injunction against enforcement should
be nationwide or solely for the enumerated plaintiffs
became the next question. The preliminary injunction
“should be no more burdensome to the defendant
than necessary to provide complete relief to the
plaintiffs.”59  Nationwide made sense as the plaintiffs
were located all over the US. Also, nationwide
injunctions ideally fit immigration issues60 given
Congress wanted uniformity in immigration rules.61
Establishment Clause constitutional violations
affected more than the immediate plaintiffs, so
national application was logical. The district court
appropriately decided on a national injunction to
provide complete relief.62
Injunctions normally could not be issued against the
President in executing Congressional legislation.63 In
fact, generally, the President could not be judicially
barred from completing official duties.64 Thus, the
district court did improperly issue the injunction
against the President, which was then lifted.
Otherwise, the injunction remained in full effect.
PASSENGER TRANSPORTATION
IMPLICATIONS
Moving forward, bans on the movement of travelers
and immigrants can be enacted and be
constitutional. The key, though, is that the ban would
have to be facially legitimate and bona fide. If so,
courts would give significant deference to the other
branches’ decisions and likely uphold them under
rational basis review.
However, with bad faith and the Establishment
Clause also implicated, the reasons underlying the
decision would then be reviewed. They would have
to be primarily secular for the ban to survive judicial
scrutiny.  By the way here, the fact an injunction
could not be issued against the President himself
was an inconsequential finding. Indeed, the second
EO’s orders were enjoined from being enforced by
anyone.
Given President Trump’s possible anti-Muslim
campaign rhetoric that the court referenced in its
decision, he would face significant legal difficulties in
ever implementing EO travel or immigration bans
effectively. If this case established any legal
certainties, it was this one.  However, if the
Executive Branch can establish a bona fide national
security case, it may be able to secure judicial
support of travel restrictions that are measured and
in response to specific demonstrated risks.
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